






On the equivalence between progressive taxation 




Biung-Ghi Ju and Juan D. Moreno-Ternero 
 CORE DISCUSSION PAPER 
2007/2 
 
On the equivalence between progressive taxation  
and inequality reduction 
 







We  establish  the  precise  connections  between  progressive  taxation  and 
inequality reduction, in a setting where the level of tax revenue to be raised is 
endogenously fixed and tax schemes are balanced. We show that, in contrast 
with the traditional literature on taxation, the equivalence between inequality 
reduction and the combination of progressivity and income order preservation 
does  not  always  hold  in  this  setting.  However,  we  show  that,  among  rules 
satisfying consistency and, either revenue continuity, or revenue monotonicity, 
the equivalence remains intact. 
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Progressivity is the requirement that a taxpayer with a higher income should pay at least as
much rate of tax as a taxpayer with a lower income. Inequality reduction is the requirement
that ￿income inequality￿should be reduced after taxation.1 It has long been perceived in the
literature of taxation that the two principles are closely related (see, for instance, Musgrave
and Thin, 1948; Fellman, 1976; and Kakwani, 1977). Jakobsson (1976) was the ￿rst to notice
that this relation could be stated as an equivalence, provided tax functions preserve the order of
incomes. The equivalence was proven later formally by Eichhorn et al. (1984) and Thon (1987).
In that literature, the two principles are de￿ned as properties of a tax function, a real-valued
function associating with any level of income a tax amount. We investigate the two principles
in a di⁄erent but related model of taxation introduced by O￿ Neill (1982) and Young (1987,
1988).2 In this model, a taxation problem is identi￿ed by a pro￿le of incomes and an amount
of tax revenue. A (taxation) rule associates with each problem a pro￿le of tax amounts of
which the sum equals the desired tax revenue. We show that, in this model, the above logical
equivalence no longer holds. In fact, inequality reduction implies neither progressivity nor income
order preservation, as shown by our Examples 1 and 2. However, our main result shows that,
among the rules satisfying two standard axioms known as consistency (the way any group of
taxpayers split their total tax contribution depends only on their own taxable incomes) and
revenue continuity (small changes in the tax revenue do not produce a jump in tax schedules),
the equivalence remains intact. The role of revenue continuity in this result can also be played
by the solidarity property known as revenue monotonicity (when the tax revenue increases, no
one pays less).
2 Model and basic concepts
We study taxation problems in a variable-population model. The set of potential taxpayers, or
agents, is identi￿ed by the set of natural numbers N. Let N be the set of ￿nite subsets of N,
with generic element N. For each i 2 N, let yi 2 R+ be i￿ s (taxable) income and y ￿ (yi)i2N the
income pro￿le. A (taxation) problem is a triple consisting of a population N 2 N, an income
pro￿le y 2 RN
+, and a tax revenue T 2 R+ such that
P
i2N yi ￿ T. Let Y ￿
P
i2N yi. Let DN
be the set of taxation problems with population N and D ￿ [N2NDN.
Given a problem (N;y;T) 2 D, a tax pro￿le is a vector x 2 RN satisfying the following
two conditions: (i) for each i 2 N, 0 ￿ xi ￿ yi and (ii)
P
i2N xi = T.3 We refer to (i) as
boundedness and (ii) as balancedness.4 A (taxation) rule on D, R: D ! [N2NRN, associates
with each problem (N;y;T) 2 D a tax pro￿le R(N;y;T). We refer readers to Young (1987,
1This requirement is based on the inequality comparison known as the Lorenz dominance relation.
2See Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003, 2006) for extensive treatments of this model and some other related
allocation problems.
3Throughout the paper, for each N 2 N, each M ￿ N, and each z 2 R
N, let zM ￿ (zi)i2M.
4Note that boundedness implies that each agent with zero income pays zero tax.
11988) for de￿nitions of various taxation rules. A well-known example is the so-called leveling
tax L: D ! [N2NRN that makes post-tax incomes as equal as possible, provided no agent
ends up being subsidized (i.e., paying a negative tax). Formally, for each (N;y;T) 2 D and
each i 2 N, Li(N;y;T) ￿ maxfyi ￿ 1=￿;0g, where ￿ is a non-negative real number satisfying
P
i2N maxfyi ￿ 1=￿;0g = T.
We now de￿ne our two main axioms of taxation.
Progressivity postulates that, for any pair of agents, the one with higher income should face
a tax rate at least as high as the rate the other faces.
Axiom 1 Progressivity. For each (N;y;T) 2 D and each i;j 2 N, if 0 < yi ￿ yj,
Ri(N;y;T)=yi ￿ Rj(N;y;T)=yj.
Our second axiom says that ￿income inequality￿ should be reduced after taxation. This
axiom is based on the following basic income inequality comparison. For each population N ￿
f1;:::;ng and each pair of income pro￿les y;y0 2 RN
+, y Lorenz dominates y0 if, for each
k = 1;:::;n ￿ 1, the proportion of the sum of the k lowest incomes to the total income at y
is greater than (or equal to) the same proportion at y0: that is, when y1 ￿ y2 ￿ :::: ￿ yn and
y0
1 ￿ y0
2 ￿ ::: ￿ y0











Axiom 2 Inequality reduction. For each (N;y;T) 2 D, the post-tax income pro￿le y ￿
R(N;y;T) Lorenz dominates the pre-tax income pro￿le y.
We will investigate logical relations between the two axioms, invoking in the process some
of the following standard axioms.5
The ￿rst axiom requires that post-tax incomes be in the order of pre-tax incomes.
Axiom 3 Income order preservation. For each (N;y;T) 2 D and each pair i;j 2 N, if
yi ￿ yj, yi ￿ Ri (N;y;T) ￿ yj ￿ Rj (N;y;T).
The next axiom requires that the way any group of taxpayers split their total tax contribution
depends only on their own taxable incomes.
Axiom 4 Consistency. For each (N;y;T) 2 D, each M ￿ N, and each i 2 M,
Ri(M;yM;
P
i2M xi) = xi; where (xi)i2N ￿ R(N;y;T) and yM ￿ (yi)i2M.
The next axiom says that small changes in revenue should not produce a jump in tax sched-
ules.
Axiom 5 Revenue continuity. For each N 2 N, each y 2 RN
+, each sequence fTn : n 2 Ng
in R+ and each T 2 R+, if Tn converges to T, then R(N;y;Tn) converges to R(N;y;T).
Our ￿nal axiom says that no one pays less when the tax revenue increases.
Axiom 6 Revenue monotonicity. For each (N;y;T) 2 D and each T0 ￿ T, R(N;y;T0) =
R(N;y;T).
5We refer readers to Thomson (2003, 2006) for detailed discussions on these axioms.
23 Results
As in the literature on tax functions mentioned in the introduction, the combination of progres-
sivity and income order preservation implies inequality reduction. Essentially, the same proof
of Eichhorn et al. (1984) works, which will be provided for completeness in the appendix. Our
next examples show, however, that inequality reduction implies neither progressivity nor income
order preservation.
Example 1 We construct a tax pro￿le that reduces inequality but that is not progressive. The
idea is that when there is too high a gap between the richest agent and anyone else, we impose
a very large tax burden on the richest agent and a low and equal burden on all others. Consider
y ￿ (2;3;15) and T ￿ 10: Let " be a number such that 0 < " ￿ 1. Let (";";10 ￿ 2") be the
tax pro￿le for this problem. Then the post-tax income pro￿le is given by (2 ￿ ";3 ￿ ";5 + 2")
Note that both income-order preservation and tax-order preservation (i.e., rules do not impose
lower tax burdens for agents with higher incomes) are satis￿ed. Since (2=20;5=20;20=20) ￿
((2 ￿ ")=10;(5 ￿ 2")=10;10=10), the post-tax income pro￿le Lorenz dominates y. Thus, the tax
pro￿le satis￿es inequality reduction. Note that, at the above problem, the tax rate of agent 1,
"=2, is higher than the tax rate of agent 2, "=3, thus violating progressivity. Therefore, any
rule that takes this tax pro￿le as its value at the above problem and that continues to satisfy
inequality reduction, at any other problem, will su¢ ce to show that inequality reduction does
not imply progressivity.6
Example 2 We de￿ne a rule that reduces inequality but violates income order preservation.
The idea is similar to the previous example. We impose a very large tax burden on the richest
agent and no burden at all on other agents, when tax revenue is within a ￿xed range. Let N ￿
f1;2;:::;ng. For each (N;y;T) 2 D, let ￿ T ￿ min
￿





yi and ￿: N ! N is a permutation such that y￿(1) ￿ y￿(2) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ y￿(n).. Let
Tm ￿ minfT; ￿ Tg and
R(N;y;T) ￿ Tme￿(n) + L(N;y ￿ Tme￿(n);T ￿ Tm);
where L denotes the leveling tax and e￿(n) denotes the unit vector with 1 in the ￿ (n)-th com-
ponent.7 We show in the appendix that R satis￿es inequality reduction (as well as revenue
continuity and revenue monotonicity) but violates income order preservation.
To recover the equivalence between inequality reduction and progressivity in our model, it
su¢ ces to impose two additional but standard axioms: consistency and revenue continuity (or
revenue monotonicity).
6For example, when there is a group of agents whose incomes are su¢ ciently lower than those of the other
agents, we de￿ne R(￿) as in the example by choosing " su¢ ciently close to zero. For other problems we set the
value of R(￿) at the tax pro￿le provided by the leveling tax, which satis￿es inequality reduction as well as the two
order preservation axioms.
7Note that, when y￿(n) = y￿(n￿1); ￿ T = 0 and R(N;y;T) = L(N;y;T). Thus, the de￿nition does not depend
on the choice of ￿ and therefore R(￿) is well-de￿ned.
3Proposition 1 The following statements hold:
(i) Progressivity and income order preservation together imply inequality reduction.
(ii) Inequality reduction and consistency together imply progressivity.
(iii) Inequality reduction, together with consistency and revenue continuity (or revenue monotonic-
ity), implies income order preservation.
The proof of the proposition appears in the appendix.
Example 1 shows that consistency is essential for part (ii) of the proposition and also that
adding income order preservation to inequality reduction is not su¢ cient to get progressivity.
Example 2 shows that consistency is essential for part (iii) of the proposition.
The next result follows directly from Proposition 1.
Corollary 2 For consistent and revenue-continuous (or revenue-monotonic) rules, the combi-
nation of progressivity and income order preservation is equivalent to inequality reduction.
A Proofs
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 1] (i) Let R be a rule satisfying progressivity and income order
preservation. Let (N;y;T) 2 D. Assume, without loss of generality, that 0 < y1 ￿ y2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ yn.







































(yi ￿ xi). (2)
By income order preservation, the post-tax income pro￿le (yi ￿ xi)i2N preserves the order of
the pre-tax income pro￿le y. Thus, (2) shows that the post-tax income pro￿le Lorenz dominates
the pre-tax income pro￿le.
(ii) Let R be a rule satisfying inequality reduction and consistency. Suppose, by contradiction,
that R is not progressive. Then, there exist (N;y;T) 2 D and i;j 2 N, such that 0 < yi ￿ yj
and Ri(N;y;T)=yi > Rj(N;y;T)=yj. Let ai ￿ 1 ￿
Ri(N;y;T)
yi and aj ￿ 1 ￿
Rj(N;y;T)
yj . Then,










Let T0 ￿ Ri (N;y;T) + Rj (N;y;T). Consider (fi;jg;(yi;yj);T0) 2 D. By consistency,
Rk (fi;jg;(yi;yj);T0) = Rk (N;y;T) for each k = i;j, and therefore, yk￿Rk (fi;jg;(yi;yj);T0) =
akyk for each k = i;j. Thus, (3) contradicts inequality reduction.
4(iii) Let R be a rule satisfying consistency, revenue continuity and inequality reduction (the
same argument applies when revenue continuity is replaced by revenue monotonicity). Then, by
the second statement, R satis￿es progressivity and therefore equal treatment of equals, i.e., agents
with the same income face the same tax burden. By Lemma 1 in Young (1987), R also satis￿es
revenue monotonicity. Suppose, by contradiction, that R violates income order preservation.
Then, there exist (N;y;T) 2 D and i;j 2 N such that yi < yj and yi ￿ xi > yj ￿ xj, where
x ￿ R(N;y;T). By consistency, R(fi;jg;(yi;yj);xi + xj) = (xi;xj). Let n 2 N be such that
n ￿ 1 >
(yj ￿ xj)(yj ￿ yi)
yi(yi ￿ xi ￿ yj + xj)
. (4)
Consider the problem (N0;y0;T0) 2 D with N0 = fi;jg[M such that jMj = n￿1, M \N = ;,
y0
j = yj, y0
k = yi for each k 2 M [ fig, and T0 = nxi + xj. By equal treatment of equals,
there exist a;b 2 R+ such that for each k 2 M [ fig, Rk (N0;y0;T0) = a and Rj(N0;y0;T0) = b.
If a + b > xi + xj, then by consistency and revenue monotonicity, R(fi;jg;(yi;yj);a + b) =
R(fi;jg;(y0
i;y0
j);a+b) = (a;b) ￿ (xi;xj) = R(fi;jg;(yi;yj);xi + xj). Then na+b > nxi+xj =
T0; contradicting balancedness. A similar contradiction occurs if a + b < xi + xj. Therefore,






xi if k 2 M [ fig
xj if k = j











k ￿ Rk (N0;y0;T0)g
P
k2N0(y0
k ￿ Rk (N0;y0;T0)
=
yj ￿ xj




(yj ￿ xj)(yj ￿ yi)
yi(yi ￿ xi ￿ yj + xj)
,
contradicting (4).
Proof. [Proof of Example 2] Let N ￿ f1;:::ng and (N;y;T) 2 D. Without loss of generality,
assume y1 ￿ y2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ yn. Let Tm ￿ minfT; ￿ Tg. Then R(N;y;T) ￿ Tmen+L(N;y￿Tmen;T￿
Tm):
To show that R(￿) violates income order preservation, consider (N;y;T) ￿ (f1;2;3g;(1;3;4);2).
Then R(N;y;T) = (0;0;2) and the post-tax income pro￿le is (1;3;2), where the order of incomes
of agents 2 and 3 is reversed.
We now show that R(￿) satis￿es inequality reduction. Let (N;y;T) be a problem and y￿ ￿
y ￿ R(N;y;T) be the corresponding post-tax income pro￿le. Let ￿: N ! N be such that
y￿
￿(1) ￿ y￿
￿(2) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ y￿
￿(n). Let y0 ￿ y ￿ Tmen and T0 = T ￿ Tm.
Since ￿ T ￿ yn ￿ yn￿2, yn￿2 ￿ yn ￿ ￿ T. Then, using the fact that L(￿) satis￿es income
order preservation, we can show that y￿
n￿2 ￿ y￿
n and y￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ y￿
n￿2 ￿ y￿
n. Hence for each
5i ￿ n ￿ 2, ￿ (i) = i. Note that if Tm ￿ yn ￿ yn￿1, ￿ (n ￿ 1) = n ￿ 1 and ￿(n) = n and that if
Tm > yn ￿ yn￿1, ￿ (n ￿ 1) = n and ￿ (n) = n ￿ 1:8
Note that for each i ￿ n￿1, Ri(N;y;T) = Li(N;y0;T0) and Rn(N;y;T) = Tm+Ln(N;y0;T0):

























where the ￿rst inequality holds by the inequality reduction property of L(￿).
Case 2. Tm > yn￿yn￿1. Then for each i ￿ n￿2, ￿ (i) = i, ￿ (n ￿ 1) = n, and ￿ (n) = n￿1.
For each k ￿ n ￿ 2, by the same reasoning as above we show that the share of the sum of
k lowest incomes after tax is greater than (or equal to) the sum of k lowest incomes before tax.
For k = n ￿ 1,
Pn￿1














i ￿ Li(N;y0;T0)) + y0
n ￿ Ln(N;y0;T0)















where the ￿rst inequality holds for the inequality reduction property of L(￿) and the second




m ￿ yn ￿ yn￿1, then y
0
n￿1 = yn￿1 ￿ yn ￿ T
m = y
0









0), that is, y
￿












n, which means ￿(n ￿ 1) = n ￿ 1 and ￿ (n) = n. An analogous proof can be given for the case in
which T
m ￿ yn ￿ yn￿1.
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